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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsJEROME YECK,

Case Nos.
14826
and
14831

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Jerome Yeck, appeals from an order
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the
charge of theft by deception, a third degree felony, and
the judgment and sentence entered thereon in the Second
Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding.

The appellant also

appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea to the charge of theft by deception, a second
degree felony, and the judgment and sentence entered
thereon in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
presiding.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISPOSITION

I~J

THE LOWER COURT

Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
in the Second Judicial District Court was denied by the
Honorable Calvin Gould on October 5, 1976, and appellant
was sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison "not
exceeding five

(5) years," with execution of the

sentence stayed pending appeal.

Appellant's motion to

withdraw his guilty plea in the Third Judicial District
was denied by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., on
September 23, 1976, and appellant was sentenced to a term
in the Utah State Prison of one of fifteen years, with
execution of the sentence stayed pending his appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the orders in both the
Second Judicial District and Third Judicial District
denying appellant's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 7, 1976, a complaint was filed in Ogden
City Court charging the appellant with theft by deception
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-405 (1953), as
amended; on April 13, 1976, another complaint was filed
in Ogden City Court charging the appellant with obtaining
money by false pretenses in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-20-8

(1953), as amended.
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d .. 1

(Record of Second Ju 1cia

District Court, hereinafter "Record-SJDC:" 1,2).

on

April 23, 1976, a complaint was filed in Salt Lake
City Court charging the appellant with one count of
forgery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1953),
as amended, and two counts of theft by deception in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended.
(Record of Third Judicial District Court, hereinafter
"Record-TJDC:" 5).
Respondent essentially agrees with the appellant's
assessment of other potential actions against him in that
the appellant was informed at the time of his arraignment
and at subsequent proceedings in the Third Judicial
District that the Utah State Attorney General's Office
had also received complaints to their "white collar crime
unit," and that this office was prepared to file additional
felony charges for alleged similar conduct against the
appellant.
Charges in the Second Judicial District Court
On June 14, 1976, the appellant was arraigned
on the charge of obtaining money under false pretenses
in the Second Judicial District Court.

(Record-SJDC: 24).

The charge was apparently dismissed as there is no
further reference to it in the record.
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On August 11, 1976, when the appellant was to
be tried for the charge of theft by deception, the
jurors were called and sworn.

The State asked one

question after which the Court and counsel retired to
chambers.

The jurors were excused and the case was

continued to August 12, 1976.

(Record SJDC: 26).

On

August 12, 1976, the appellant, through his counsel,
Phil L. Hansen, moved to withdraw his plea of not guilty
and entered a plea of guilty.

(Record-SJDC: 27).

At

this time the Honorable Calvin Gould questioned the
appellant extensively as per constitutional requirements.
"THE COURT: Mr. Yeck, I need to talk
to you for a few minutes.
How old are you?
MR. YECK:
THE COURT:
have?

Forty years old, your Honor.
And how much education do you

MR. YECK:
I have about, all told, your
Honor, ten years of college.
I have never
finished any one field.
I started in East
Los Angeles in Law School, two years; went
to two years to dental school; and three
years to Maryland University, an ext7nsi~n
course, while I was in the Army serving in
Germany, Maryland University of Munich,
Germany; and came back and picked up some
courses at Westminister College and Utah
University.
THE COURT: And would I correctly assume
that you have had some substantial experience
in business affairs?
MR. YECK:

Yes, sir.
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THE COURT:
You understand what it
means, the phrase cheat or defraud?
MR. YECK:

Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: And you understand what
dollar values mean?
MR. YECK:

Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: And are you acquainted with
a person named Richard E. Nilsson?
MR. YECK:

I am, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, as you stand before me
today, Mr. Yeck, you came here to the
court room from your home, would that be
correct?
MR. YECK:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Have you had any occasion to
have any intoxicating beverages or anything
this morning?
MR. YECK:

No, sir, I have not.

THE COURT:
Have you been taking any drugs
or anything?
MR. YECK:

No, sir.

THE COURT:
Have you been feeling in any
sense ill this morning, other than maybe
butterflies in your tummy from coming to
court?
MR. YECK:

No, sir, I haven't.

THE COURT: You are not suffering from
any feelings of the flu or anything of
that nature?
MR. YECK:
haven't.

No, sir, not to my knowledge, I

THE COURT: And you have had a chance to
discuss this case now with your attorney,
Mr. Hansen, is that correct?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. YECK:

That's correct, sir.

THE COURT: And as you stand before me
this morning you feel that you are able
to think clearly and make sound judgments
and decisions?
MR. YECK:

I believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT:
If he enters the plea of
guilty, Mr. Hansen, it will be with
your concurrence, I presume, based upon
your view of the evidence?
MR. HANSEN:
my advice.

Not only my concurrence, but

THE COURT:
If you enter the plea of guilty,
Mr. Yeck, will it be because you were involved with Mr. Nilsson in a scheme of some
kind which endeavored to cheat him or defraud him?
MR. YECK:
THE COURT:

I don't understand that.
Well

--

MR. YECK:
I went into a business transaction with Mr. Nilsson to cheat him?
THE COURT.
MR. YECK:

Yes.
No, sir, I didn't do that.

MR. HANSEN:
By this, I have explained to
you, Mr. Yeck, if you are going to plead
guilty, it is tantamount to your admitting
what they have alleged against you, and
they have alleged against you that there
has been some criminal acts involved here
in that there were false pretenses. Now
when you say you didn't intend to cheat .
him this means in the law that to constitute
a c; ime there must be an act and your intent.
And they must concur at the same time, at
the very time that this offense was to have
taken place.
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. Now if in fact you intended to pay
him ~ac~ later, that's no defense.
But if in fact you knew everything wasn't
lega~, according to Hoyle, at the time you
received the money -MR. YECK:
MR. HANSEN:
MR. YECK:
yes.

Yes.
Then it would be guilty.
I will have to go with that,

THE COURT: All right. Then to the -is he ready to plead now, Mr. Hansen?
MR. HANSEN:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: To the Information charging
you with obtaining money under false
pretenses, a felony, what is your plea,
guilty or not guilty?
MR. YECK:

Guilty, your Honor.

THE COURT: That plea may be entered and
stand.
I suppose that we want to presentence referral?
(Record-SJDC: 55-58).
Appellant's sentencing date was set for September
1, 1976, and he was referred to Adult Probation and
Parole for pre-sentence investigation and report.
SJDC: 27).

(Record-

On September 1, 1976, appellant failed to

appear for sentencing nor was he represented by counsel.
A bench warrant was issued against him.

(Record-SJDC: 32).

On September 7, 1976, the appellant appeared but without
counsel.
15, 1976.

The court continued the matter to September
(Record-SJDC: 35).

Appellant obtained new

counsel, and on September 15, 1976, upon request of new
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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counsel, the court continued the matter to September
22, 1976.

(Record-SJDC: 43).

Finally on September

22, 1976, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea and the issue was argued before the Honorable Calvin
Gould.

The court took the motion under advisement.

(Record-SJDC: 44).

On October 5, 1976, the court denied

appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
set the sentencing date as October 13, 1976.
SJDC: 45).

and
(Record-

On October 13, 1976, the Honorable Calvin

Gould stayed imposition of sentence pending this appeal.
(Record-SJDC: 46).
Charges in the Third Judicial District Court
Although the record is not as complete as in
the Second Judicial District Court, it is clear that on
July 15, 1976, the appellant was arraigned in the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
Jur., presiding.
he pled

not guilty to the charges of forgery and theft

by deception.
1976.

Through his attorney, Phil L. Hansen,

The Court set his trial for September 20,

(Record-TJDC: 10).

On September 8, 1976, on the

State's motion the Court dismissed the forgery count and
one count of theft by deception and allowed the appellant
to enter a plea of guilty to one count of theft by
deception.

Although the court's examination of the

appellant as to the voluntariness of his plea does not
appear,
the appellant does not question on appeal the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the adequacy of this inquiry.

Appellant made this plea

on the advice of his attorney, Phil L. Hansen.

The

court set the sentencing date to be September 16, 1976.
(Record-TJDC: 12, 25, 26).
On September 16, 1976, appellant changed legal
counsel.

At his new counsel's request, the court continued

the matter to September 22, 1976.

(Record-TJDC: 13).

On September 22, 1976, the appellant moved to withdraw
his guilty plea.

The court heard arguments from both

counsel and denied appellant's motion on the basis that
the appellant's plea had been made voluntarily and knowingly.
(Record-TJDC: 23).

On September 23, 1976, the Court

ordered the appellant to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic
evaluation, and on September 25, 1976, the court stayed
imposition of sentence pending this appeal.

(Record-TJDC: 36).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA IS NOT AN
ABSOLUTE RIGHT AND WHETHER IT IS GRANTED OR DENIED IS
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Respondent in no way contends that a criminal
defendant's right to trial is not an absolute right
guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the United

-9-
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States Constitution and applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Respondent argues, however,

that appellant has confused the constitutional right to
trial and a defendant's request to withdraw a

guilty

plea after having made a constitutionally valid waiver
of his right to trial.

The law is clearly settled at

both the federal and state level that whether or not
a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty will be granted is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.

A

less settled question perhaps, concerns differing
standards in making that determination depending on whether
the defendant made his request for plea change before
or after imposition of sentence.
At the federal court level, in Everett v. United
States, 336 F.2d 979 (10th Cir. 1964), the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals held that:
"Far from showing a 'fair and just
reason' for a change of pleas to Count
4, appellant demonstrated by his repeated statements that he had no
reason other than wanting a trial on a
charge of which he admitted his guilt.
Unlike Gearhart, appellant offered no
defense to the charge, nor did he
allege involuntariness or any other
factor which would militate against the
correctness and truth of his guilty
plea to Count 4 which was entered
when he was represented by retained
counsel.
His contention is virtually
a claim of an absolute right to with

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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draw a guilty plea prior to
imposition of sentence. No court
has ever so held; our use of the
language 'freely allowed' plainly
implies the existence of some
circumstances in which a defendant
is not entitled to withdraw a plea
of 9U'Ilty before sentencing, and
negates any absolute right to do
so.
Overwhelming authority holds,
as has this court, that withdrawal
of a guilty plea before sentencing
is not an absolute right but a
decision within the sound discretion
of the trial court which will be
reversed by an appellate court only
for an abuse of discretion.I"
Id. 336 F.2d at 982, 983 (Emphasis
added.)
1 The last sentence of this quotation is
footnoted in the Court's opinion as
follows:
V:i ...;q111~z v. Unitrd States, 27!) F.2<l
~7 (!lth Cir. l!JGO); Unitc<l States v.
J,P~tcr, .•mpni note 10 at 500 of 2..\i F.211;
United Stntt!» v. l'ancUia11~0. s1'pra. note
34,

1n. nt

~.'"!!)

of

~fl<;

F.~.i:

\Yilli:1m~

t'.

T"!1i11:•1l Sr:it"~· 1n~ F.~.1 30 . .io (;)th Cir.
Con ,.. l"nitc1l Stat<'~. ISi F.2•1
I~ (!Ith Cir.) (p<'r c11ri:11n), l""r:rt. 1lenir4l,

l!l;-J)):

:: ll C.S. !>111, 71 S.Ct. 7:':--1, fl:J L.l:d.
1:::-11 ( Hl:-il l: lk·r::cn ,._ l'nitrd !'t:it<'~.
11~ F.~u 1.'il. l~G (Sth Cir. l~Hl:
1·11it1'•l States , .. Colonnn, s11prn note 10:
:-.t'C l"nitcd :-::tnt"s , .. TI11:;!'lil'~. !lllfml ll'ltl"
1tl: J:ad1d , .. L"nit"•l State~. Gl F'.~•l
::1;t1, :;t;:.! <Sth Cir. l!):}~); ~wifc '· r11itf'1l
~t:tl<'.o.:, 'i:-l 1".!'-'. .. \pp.V.<'. :J'i. :: .....~. 1 h l".
'..:!·I ::t~l. ::r.::! (1!11:-i) (1li«tu111); r_f. lfoyt
\·. l°11itt>1l ~t;th•s, :!.-,~ l".:::!•I •Jl;O, -11;:! (lllth
('ir. l!J'."",.";l . •\n•I s"'~ :'\nt1', ll'i/h1fr1111·nl
f.'11ilt.11 J'/crPt, ;,;J C1..lIX~t.L.I:n·. ::!GG,

n/

C:oo , .. United Stntes, rupra. note 15;
:Ccr~l'n l'. enit('(l Stntcs, ,:.11prn. notr. 1;; nt
JS~r-1$7, of 14;j F.2d; Swift l'. Unitl'd
~tatf's, "m1u·c1. note 15; Unitr•l 8t:ttes \"".
Colt1nna, su11ra note 10; UnitN.l Stnte~
,._ Fo~ • .rnpra 11otr. 10 nt r.n-r.n of 1!!0
F.:!•l; ""artl v. T'nite1l Rl:tt('s, 111) l•".~M
1:~a. 1:-:f; (lilh C'ir. l!llO):
Rrhl"lf , •.
\:nitP1l :0-::t:tt('i., ~.": )1'.'.:!1\ ::?f~'1. ~1;.1 (Sth <'ir.
lH!.!!l); ~ec linit<·•l Stat<"!11 ,., :-:milr.y, ~22
1"'.2rl 21-r:I, 2 rn (2J Cir. Jnr~'J) (11cr
curi:un): c/. Tomlinson v. {Tnitr•l St.'ltt'!l,
C.S U.S ..\pp.D.C. IOG, IOS, 93 F.:!d w:!,

(>j4 (In3j). cert dcniecl sub nom., Prott
v. United States, 303 U.S. 6-12, 5S S.Ct.
G-1~. ~2 r,.1-;.1. l HY.l (ln::S): Iloyt ..-.
Un!tr<l Stntc~. su1wa note 15; UnitcJ
Stntes ,.. Liao;, ~:tpra note 11. Rut cf.
Knclwl'll "· Uniteil Stntc9, aHpra note 1·1.
In the r""<'nt Xn9clbcrg cnsr, the Snpnmc C'ourt held that the District Court

::!ID (lfJj:j).
)1arl l]isaction to ticrmit the u·itlulr:tw:ll
Jli:.:h v. l"i1it1'(l !'t:1t<'~. !Ht[>r<I nntc 11,
of n i:;-uilt;r plea on n motion in wl1i<."h
JlO .lr.s .. \pp.U.1'. :1t ~!•, ~,.., F.:!.J :tt -t:n;
the GO\·crnmr.nt had ncquicscctl bcC':tnsc
1·nit .. 1l ~tatcs ,._ Jln:;ILC' ..;;, . . 11r11n noi(' 10:
of ,Jrrentlant's utrnsh·c coo(•Cr:itinn.
1 ·11itl'1l ::.:t.1te.;; c (;11,..rini. :!!!Li F.~d :n, ~! 1
1.~he Court vncntr.•l the ju1l,::mr>nt of the
(Ith ('ir. l!Hil); 1'11itr1l St:itPs \-. :'.foorc,
Court 11[ Appeal~. :123 l•'.:?<l 93G C?il Cir.
'.._!~)U F.~11 i10l (:!1l Cir.) (prr c11ri:im);
1na:n (Jil'r curi:uul, aml remnn1lt•\I the
c•'rt. 1l1·nil'tl, :-;n.~ CS. ~:-:-;, ."-::.! ::..Ct. -l!J, '
case t<• th<! Distri•·t Court (or further
J..Ed.~·I 3..., (l!llit); Yasf}Uf'7. \-. l'nitl'1l
proccc1li11;:-s in con[ormily witl1 its 01.. in·
1
ion; it. cfol not di red thnt Jca,·c t~ u·1th:-::t:1f""=· s11:1nl uoti~ 1:;; ~·1.~t ~l,_ 1 ~:~·~c~
, .. ~i~:rn. supru uotc 10 at•'•· _t,_ 1.-~.
dran· rite J•lca be ;:rnntc-11. Xagdher;: , .•
l 11 itccl ~t:1fl's , .. I.r:-:ter, S~f'~" ~i~t·~ };•l:
lJnitc1l ~tntr~. 377 U.R. :?1'.tlt S-l S.C"t.
1 ·nit1•d ~t:1tcs v. i\Ian.·u~. _] .• I- ·- 11 _ _,t'
12,,2, I'.! L.E.l.'.!.I 200 (!!>GI) (per
~:::! (ltli Cir.L cert. d1~nil' 1 l. :~I-~ C.~~ ~'.!-!,
curiam).
-;;-, :--:.ct. ~!). D!l L.E.J. r..;o ( l!l:j-j I; l 111h.:_1l
:--:r;1t1·s \'. l':1111•hi:111co. supra note 1~;
\\'Jlli:1n1-:
\". L"niti>1l
St:ites
. .<~lf[irtl nntc
l.J;by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the state level also, this Court has held
on numerous occasions

that a guilty plea is addressed

to the sound discretion of the trial court and that a
criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea as a
matter of sight.

State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378

P.2d 671 (1963); State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d
825 (1932).

These concepts have just recently been

reaffirmed in State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977)
and in State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977).

In

Forsyth, this Court stated:
"The motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty is addressed to the discretion
of the court; and as in all discretionary
matters, due to his prerogatives and his
advantaged position, the trial judge
is allowed considerable latitude in the
exercise of that discretion, which the
appellate court will not interfere with
unless it plainly appears that there
was abuse thereof." Id. at 339.
This Court in Larson stated also:
"A motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and
a criminal defendant may not withdraw
a guilty plea as a matter of right."
Id. at 336.
See also State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976);
McGiff v. State, 514 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1973); and Meyer
v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1970).
What appellant would have this Court do is
decide against the great weight of authority and hold that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a defendant has the absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea at any time before his sentencing.

Such a holding

would make plea bargaining an ineffective tool in
the criminal justice system because a criminal defendant
could stall final disposition of his charge indefinitely.
Further, to allow a defendant to withdrawaconstitutionally
valid waiver of his right to trial only on the basis of
his own self-serving declarations makesamockery of
any kind of constitutionally valid waiver.

A valid

waiver is either a solid waiver or it is not:

a defendant

cannot have it both ways.
Appellant's argument that he only seeks to be
tried for the offenses with which he was charged and
that therefore no prejudice results the state misses
the whole premise on which his plea of guilty was
based.

The point is, appellant has had his opportunity;

he had a constitutional right to be tried by a jury for
the offenses with which he has charged.

After deliberation

with his attorney, by appellant's own admission one of
the best criminal defense attorney's in the state, the
appellant plead guilty.

Two different court's questioned

the appellant as to his understanding and his voluntariness
in entering the pleas.

Appellant is a man of considerable

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

He in no way argues that there was any-

thing deficient about either court's examination of
him.

In short, the appellant waived his right to

trial by jury.

Since he does not contest the validity

of his waiver he cannot now re-claim his right to
trial merely because he has changed his mind.

Regard-

less of any good faith he might have, there exists no
court authority anywhere in this country standing
the proposition appellant now asserts.

for

Once a

defendant makes a valid waiver he must make some kind
of showing (e.g. a "fair and just reason" as in
the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction
States, supra.)

Everett v. United

before he should be granted permission

to change his plea.

Appellant has not cited any

authority, nor does any exist, that a defendant's
change of mind constitutes a "fair and just reason"
requiring a trial court to change his plea.
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's
contention runs against the grain of federal courts'
and this state court's decisions on the issue of
whether to accept a defendant's request for withdrawal
of a guilty plea after a constitutional waiver.

For

this Court to reverse its past decisions and the great
1 The appellant, in response to questioning by the
Honorable Calvin Gould responded that he h~s had about t~
years of college, including two yE:ars in law school, two Y'
in dental school, and extension courses in Maryland Univen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
and in the
Army in Germany.
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weight of authority in this country would be unwise
and would work a most severe hardship on our criminal
justice system.

The two trial courts' refusals to

allow appellant to withdraw his pleas of guilty were
within the discretion granted those courts by law.
Respondent submits that the trial courts' refusals
to allow the plea changes be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities
respondent respectfully submits that the refusal of the
trial courts to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty
pleas were well within the discretion granted those
courts by law.

The judgments and sentences of the

district courts are without error and should be affirmed
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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